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“ENCROACHMENTS AND OPPRESSIONS”:
THE CORPORATIZATION OF PROCEDURE
AND THE DECLINE OF RULE OF LAW
J. Maria Glover*
INTRODUCTION
The civil liability system in the United States has been criticized for
decades. Corporate litigants and lobbyists in particular have pushed to
restrict an “explosion” of “abusive”1 civil litigation and liability exposure.
To reduce that exposure, corporate entities have engaged in attempts to
curtail rules of substantive liability and have sought extensive procedural
reform including heightened pleading standards, stricter summary judgment
standards, heightened class-certification standards, arbitration agreements
with class action waivers, and countless others. Corporate entities have
pursued these procedural reforms as litigants and as lobbyists, restructuring
our litigation system by appealing to both the legislative and judicial
branches of government.
Despite the existence of dual-branch power over procedure, the ability of
corporate entities to pursue procedural reform in almost equal measure from
the judicial and legislative branches is a relatively recent historical
development. For over four decades after the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were promulgated, Congress barely dipped its toe in procedural
waters even though Congress retains ultimate power over procedure.2
Congress chose instead to defer to the expertise and institutional advantages
of the judiciary in matters of litigation management.3 Congressional
deference to the judicial branch in matters procedural began to wane

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Ben Zipursky,
Nora Freeman Engstrom, Myriam Gilles, David Marcus, Howard Erichson, and Bill Treanor
for helpful comments. Katy Ho provided excellent research assistance. This Article was
prepared for the Colloquium entitled Access to Justice and the Legal Profession in an Era of
Contracting Civil Liability, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law
and Ethics on October 27, 2017, at Fordham University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Briana Lynn Rosenbaum, The RICO Trend in Class Action Warfare, 102
IOWA L. REV. 165, 175 (2016); The Litigation Explosion, ONLINE LEGAL, http://www.onlinelegal.biz/robert-m/the-litigation-explosion/ [https://perma.cc/24NP-PUDK] (last visited Mar.
15, 2018).
2. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1681–82 (2004).
3. Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435,
443 (1958).
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sometime around the 1980s4 when Congress developed a sense that the Rules
Advisory Committee was exercising its rulemaking power in ways that
concealed an agenda to recalibrate substantive pronouncements of Congress
and to reduce access to court for certain litigants.5 In other words, Congress
initially intervened in matters of judicial procedure to preserve access to
justice and the rule of law.
While Congress’s involvement in procedural matters has continued—
indeed, increased—since that time, its agenda has changed. Lobbied by
corporate entities, recent procedural reforms by Congress have tended to
restrict access to justice and rule of law rather than preserve it. More than
that, what began in the 1970s and 1980s as perhaps Congress’s simple
policing of the boundaries of judicial power has turned into an all-out power
struggle: the judiciary often claims as much power as it can over procedure
even when the exercise of that power impacts congressional enactments.
Congress does the same even when its power grabs cut back at the judicial
power and expertise regarding procedure and case management. Together,
the result is that both Congress and the federal courts (particularly the U.S.
Supreme Court) are reforming procedure in ways that restrict access to justice
and diminish rule-of-law norms.
The big winner in this power struggle has been neither the judicial nor the
legislative branch but, instead, corporate entities seeking (often successfully)
to limit exposure to liability by restricting access to justice, particularly for
low-income individuals, those with low-value claims, or citizens with little
political power. This power struggle has provided corporate entities with two
bites at the procedural apple. If corporations are the big winner in this
struggle, there must be a big loser. That loser has been the rule of law. If
corporations have been the ones to succeed in this struggle, there must be a
failure—the failure of the judiciary to fulfill its unique role in our tripartite
structure of government to preserve the rule of law.
This judicial role to preserve the rule of law goes back to the time of the
framing, where the judicial branch was set apart as separate from political
processes6 that might contaminate justice, fairness, objectivity, and other
rule-of-law values. While relatively little time was spent discussing the
judicial branch at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, one of its principal
architects—Alexander Hamilton—devoted much ink to developing its

4. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1705–06.
5. See id. at 1704.
6. See, e.g., William M. Treanor, The Genius of Hamilton and the Birth of the Modern
Theory of the Judiciary, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FEDERALIST (Jack Rakove &
Colleen Sheehan eds., forthcoming 2018). When speaking on the radical nature of Hamilton’s
ideas, one of the most prominent antifederalist opponents of Hamilton’s view of the judiciary
stated, “[N]othing could have been better conceived to facilitate the abolition of the state
governments than the constitution of the judicial.” Brutus XV (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in
16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 431, 434 (John
P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1986). Indeed, Blackstone’s Commentaries treated the judiciary as
part of the executive branch. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *267; see also
FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 210 (1985) (characterizing the judiciary as “a subordinate of the executive”).
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contours and characteristics. Hamilton’s vision for the judiciary was a radical
one at the time. He, along with James Madison, ultimately rendered the
radical decidedly nonradical—so much so that Hamilton’s conception of the
federal judiciary was embodied in Article III with little protest.7 Chief among
Hamilton’s characteristics for the federal judiciary was a stalwart
commitment and unique ability to preserving the rule of law.8 This
commitment to rule of law could only be realized by a structure that
prevented “encroachments and oppressions” from the legislative branch.9
Rather than serving as a bulwark against the “encroachments and
oppressions” of the political branches of government,10 the current judiciary
has become enmeshed in a procedural power struggle that hinders its ability
to serve this role and has even, in recent years, been complicit in the corporate
takeover of procedure.11
This Article begins by providing a brief account of the corporatization of
procedure through judicial decision-making and noting some of the
detrimental effects it has had on the preservation of rule of law and access to
justice. Part II goes on to explore how the judiciary does not retain full
control over procedure and how corporate entities have little care for whether
a procedural reform simply cuts back at litigation or goes further and cuts
back at judicial power and the judicial role itself. To illustrate these points,
Part II examines the most recent attempt at “procedural reform” by corporate
entities—the proposed Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act (FICALA).
The most dramatic procedural changes in FICALA involve multidistrict
litigation (MDL). These changes would cut back significantly at judicial
power and discretion as well as the role of the judiciary in preserving the rule
of law. Part III explores one of the implications of having two political
branches and one nonpolitical branch of government—namely, that moneyed
corporate interests effectively get two bites at the procedural apple. This state
of affairs raises a number of fundamental questions, including ones regarding
the appropriate nature and scope of legislative and judicial power over
procedure. Part III grapples with those questions.

7. See Treanor, supra note 6, at 3.
8. See id.
9. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that judicial independence was
critical for the judiciary to preserve the rule of law).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT 130–
81 (2017); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 377–79 (2005); J. Maria Glover,
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3054–56
(2015) [hereinafter Glover, Disappearing Claims]; J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s
“Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1625, 1637 (2017) [hereinafter
Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action]; Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The
Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124
YALE L.J. 2804, 2809–11 (2015).
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I. THE CORPORATIZATION OF PROCEDURE BY THE JUDICIARY
Countless scholars, myself included, have traced myriad instances in
which corporate interests have achieved procedural reform through judicial
avenues. Often these interests do so in ways that hinder access to justice and
the effectuation of rule-of-law norms.12 The judiciary has done so not so
much through interpreting actual substantive rules governing primary
conduct, though it has engaged in that practice as well,13 but instead through
less politically salient procedural decision-making.14 At times, the very
judiciary tasked with guarding the rule of law, as Hamilton envisioned, has
enabled “encroachments and oppressions” upon that role. Many of these
reforms are undoubtedly motivated by the judicial branch’s disenchantment
with civil litigation.15
These procedural reforms, particularly those introduced by the Supreme
Court, are well known. To name a few recent ones, the Court has ratcheted
up pleading requirements, thus making survival of motions to dismiss more
difficult.16 The Court has fully embraced arbitration agreements that prohibit
class actions and—at least under the language of its opinion in American

12. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413–17 (2014);
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432–35 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
564 U.S. 338, 365–67 (2011); Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11,
at 1665.
14. See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1176–79 (2012) (discussing how procedural
decisions have made certain sorts of claims more difficult to bring, thus diminishing certain
regulatory regimes that rely heavily upon private enforcement); see, e.g., Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (holding that foreign corporations
are only subject to general jurisdiction where they are “at home”); Daimler AG v. Bauman,
134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (same); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304,
2311–12 (2013) (holding that arbitration agreements are enforceable according to their terms,
regardless of whether provisions in such agreements mean that no plaintiff will able to bring
a claim); Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1433–35 (narrowing the economic modeling of antitrust
injury, and possibly the economic modeling of damages in class actions, at Comcast’s urging);
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (stating that
foreign corporations are only subject to general jurisdiction where they are “at home”); J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 888 (2011) (holding that U.S. courts do not
have personal jurisdiction over a foreign company who does business in, distributes products
in, and encourages distributors to sell in the United States, and whose products caused injury
to a plaintiff in a particular state); Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 365–67 (restricting Rule 23 at
Wal-Mart’s urging); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343–44 (2011)
(permitting class action prohibitions in AT&T’s particular arbitration agreement, despite the
fact that such a holding would nullify most of plaintiffs’ claims); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007) (ratcheting up pleading requirements at the urging of the
corporate defendant Bell Atlantic).
15. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 367
n.299 (2013); Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court, Chief Justice’s 2015 Year-End Report on
the Federal Judiciary (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2015year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAE9-JT5K] (comparing discovery to duels).
16. J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713. 1740–
41 (2012); Colin T. Reardon, Note, Pleading in the Information Age, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2170,
2206 (2010).
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Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant17—agreements that may well go
further in restricting countless other procedural mechanisms. It has narrowed
courts’ authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over corporate entities
foreign and domestic. It has ratcheted up the commonality and predominance
requirements under Rule 23 for class certification, and lower federal courts
have ratcheted up requirements of ascertainability—all of which make it far
more difficult to pursue claims as a class. And the list goes on.
At least two prominent scholars have argued that these and other
procedural opinions evince an “anti-court Court.”18 If that is correct, then
perhaps the power struggle is irrelevant; both branches are serving the same
functional master—namely, to place power over rule of law and judicial
procedure more firmly in the hands of the elected legislature. Respectfully,
I disagree with that anticourt assessment. These are not the opinions of a
judiciary eager to cede its power.19 If anything, the Court in recent years has
taken many opportunities, through procedural opinions, to maintain or
increase its power.20 These recent decisions indicate that the Court and parts
of the federal judiciary are anti-litigation21—more specifically, antilitigation vis-à-vis certain types of claims and certain types of plaintiffs22—
and pro-court power. As such, in their anti-litigation opinions, the courts are
sensitive not only to preserving their procedural power but also to stretching
that power to or beyond its limits, rendering (often implicit) substantive
judgments and substantive policy preferences.23
This distinction between an “anti-court Court” and an anti-litigation Court
has critical implications for understanding the consequences of a procedural
power struggle both for corporate entities and for the rule of law. Across the
litigation landscape, the judiciary seems willing to abdicate its role in
preserving the rule of law but unwilling to give away any of its power over
procedure and, often by extension, its power over substantive policy
preferences. This leaves an enormous window for corporations to pursue
procedural reform in the judicial arena. Yet, if the corporations are
unsuccessful, they are able to seek refuge from a Congress now accustomed
to routine intervention into matters of judicial procedure.
17. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
18. David Cole, The Anti-Court Court, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2014 (book review),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/08/14/anti-court-supreme-court/
[https://perma.cc/3JX9-PFNP].
19. See id. (arguing that the Roberts Court is keen to reduce the power of the federal
judiciary).
20. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Glover, “NonTranssubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11.
21. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873
(2011); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Scott, 550
U.S. 372.
22. See Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11, at 1647–48 (noting
the Court’s seeming preference for suits by institutional investors who tend to be sophisticated,
versus consumers who tend not to be and who tend to be parties in lawyer-driven suits); Miller,
supra note 15, at 367.
23. See Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11, at 1637–53.
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Indeed, corporations pushing procedural reform are at best indifferent as
to whether they achieve their ends as litigant or lobbyist. Corporate
defendants are used to getting their way with a federal judiciary hostile to
litigation in general and aggregate litigation in particular.24 Nonetheless,
corporate defendants have no compunction about turning to other branches
for a second bite at the procedural apple—and strategically, why should they?
The results of this dual bite, however, are procedural-reform efforts that
diminish judicial power over procedure and the management of courts, as
well as the rule of law.25
The most recent procedural reform effort, FICALA, is currently pending
before the Senate Judiciary Committee.26 FICALA would achieve broadsweeping procedural change that cuts at the core of the judicial power to
manage cases and preserve the rule of law. The next Part of this Article uses
FICALA to illustrate how power struggles over procedure between the
judicial and legislative branches provide corporate entities vast opportunities
to reduce litigation exposure and, as the judiciary becomes less
“independent,” have the potential to cut back at the judicial role to preserve
the rule of law.
II. “ENCROACHMENTS AND OPPRESSIONS” OF JUDICIAL POWER
AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE: THE EXAMPLE OF FICALA
Despite the words “class action” in FICALA’s title, the class action
provisions are not the big-ticket items in this bill, even if they would achieve
some long-standing class action-restrictive goals of corporate entities.
Instead, and particularly given that the class action is already rather enfeebled
from various recent Court pronouncements, the real game in town for
aggregate litigation has become the MDL. The MDL reform proposals in
FICALA would have not only sweeping anti-litigation effects—effects the
judiciary has in recent years been willing to effectuate—but also significant
24. See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017);
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746; Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304; Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S.
27 (2013) (suggesting that damages had to be common for a class to be certified); Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873; WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 (2011) (ratcheting up the standard under 23(a)
to one of predominance under 23(b)); AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. 333; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679–80 (confirming that
plausibility pleading standards apply across all federal cases); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (discussing settlement pressure and discovery cost).
25. Corporate entities began meaningfully looking to Congress to obtain procedural
reform in the 1980s. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C
§ 78u-4 (2012) (providing a heightened pleading standard for securities fraud claims making
it harder for plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss for such claims); Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2012) (same); Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012) (reconfiguring the balance of state and federal
jurisdiction, thereby reducing the number of classes certified and ultimately brought).
26. See H.R. 985—Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim
Transparency Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/house-bill/985/all-actions [https://perma.cc/NZV9-VYQ2] (last visited Mar. 15,
2018) (showing the most recent update of the bill on March 13, 2017, when it was referred to
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
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anticourt effects. These latter effects, which cut at the heart of judicial
power, are not effects the judiciary seems particularly keen to hasten, and
they are achieved through purely procedural provisions.
A. House Bill 985 Section 105(i): “Allegations Verification”
Starting with subsection (i) of section 105 of FICALA, entitled
“Allegations Verification,” personal injury plaintiffs would be required to
submit what is known in the MDL process as a “fact sheet.”27 These fact
sheets must contain support for the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint,
including injury causation, and plaintiffs must submit them within forty-five
days after the action is placed with the MDL judge.28 The provision
expressly states that this deadline “shall not be extended.”29 After
submission, the MDL judge must review each fact statement within ninety
days and decide whether it provides sufficient evidence for plaintiff’s case to
proceed.30
This provision, written and supported by various corporate entities,31
responds to what many attorneys in the defense bar perceive as inadequate
screening of unmeritorious cases.32 To be sure, to the extent some MDL
plaintiffs are being added to plaintiff inventories with little more than a
signature and with no screening,33 there ought to be careful evaluation of
MDL procedures and possible reforms.34 The reforms proposed in
section 105(i), however, are not only premature absent empirical data but
would also not achieve accurate screening. Instead, they would encroach on
judicial power by creating potentially insurmountable burdens for MDL
27. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105(i) (2017).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See The Growth of Multidistrict Litigation: Emerging Issues and Possible Solutions,
LAW & ECON. CTR. (June 16, 2017), http://masonlec.org/events/the-growth-of-multidistrictlitigation-emerging-issues-and-possible-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/E5QL-TTLK]. At the
event, it was mentioned that the law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, which
represents Johnson & Johnson in various MDL matters, helped draft this provision based on
its experience on the ground with MDL litigation.
32. See, e.g., The Impact of Lawsuit Abuse on American Small Business and Job Creators:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 35–37 (2017) (statement of John
H. Beisner, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP); “Gateway to the West”
Becomes “Gateway to the Courts” for Dubious Science and High Damage Awards, AM. TORT
REFORM FOUND. (May 23, 2016), http://www.judicialhellholes.org/2016/05/23/gateway-tothe-west-becomes-the-gateway-to-the-courts-for-dubious-science-and-high-damage-awards/
[https://perma.cc/D358-HTJ2] (arguing that jury awards to plaintiffs who claimed that
Johnson & Johnson talcum powder caused cancer were unmeritorious); Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL) Conference, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Oct. 18, 2017), https://fedsoc.org/
conferences/multidistrict-litigation-mdl-conference?#agenda-item-eliminating-meritlessclaims [https://perma.cc/J8QJ-ZX3J] (discussing the “problem” of unmeritorious cases,
particularly tag-along cases, in MDL).
33. See generally John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving
the MDL Process, 38 LITIGATION 26 (2012).
34. “[L]aw in its ordinary mode of operating offers normative guidance” to citizens and
litigants. Gerald J. Postema, Fidelity in Law’s Commonwealth, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE
OF LAW 17, 28 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014).
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judges and oppress rule-of-law norms by systematically screening out
meritorious cases.
As to the former—the encroachment of judicial power and discretion—
there is ample reason to believe that judges cannot read and analyze for
sufficiency hundreds, maybe thousands,35 of facts sheets within ninety days
of submission. Given these time constraints, this provision could well be the
death knell for MDL. Judges in the MDL are volunteers who take on the
important work of MDL on top of their regular caseload. This provision
would likely put an end to that volunteerism.
As to the latter—oppressing access to justice and rule of law—this
provision is at best indifferent to the scores of meritorious cases that would
be screened out by a provision both so broad and so rigid. To illustrate,
imagine a fictional plaintiff, Mr. Jones.36 Mr. Jones received an injection of
Heparin, a blood thinner. So far as we know, Heparin is generally safe. Some
people, however, received Heparin injections pulled from one of many
batches manufactured in China, which contained a dangerous contaminant—
so dangerous, in fact, that this contaminant has caused 149 deaths in U.S.
patients in 2007 and 2008.37
How is Mr. Jones (or his estate) supposed to craft a section 105(i) fact
statement in forty-five days? Mr. Jones needs discovery on any number of
issues: Where were the tainted batches distributed? What facilities actually
received and used the tainted batches? What batch did his injection come
from? Where was his batch manufactured? Where was his batch screened?
And so on. Mr. Jones does not have access to that information; the defendant
does. And Mr. Jones cannot expect to get discovery in the first forty-five
days.
Mr. Jones, then, is out of luck. He could have all the law and facts in the
world on his side. Yet in the face of section 105(i), he loses. He will not be
the only one. Whether it is bad-batch cases, sample cases, or any number of
other scenarios, section 105(i) is a death knell for countless meritorious
claims across the swath of the litigation landscape. Quite a swipe to the rule
of law.
It need not be so. To the extent reform is needed in this area, it might call
for heightened use of existing screening mechanisms or heightened screening
35. The most extreme example is a set of MDL cases devoted to claims alleging injuries
from pelvic mesh manufactured by Johnson & Johnson (J&J) and its subsidiaries. All claims
against seven different defendants have been consolidated before Judge Joseph Goodwin in
the Southern District of West Virginia, and there have been over 80,000 claims filed. See, e.g.,
Amanda Robert, Pelvic Mesh MDL “Most Complicated in History,” Plaintiff Attorney Says,
LEGAL NEWSLINE (Nov. 24, 2015), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/510649797-pelvic-meshmdl-most-complicated-mdl-in-history-plaintiff-attorney-says [https://perma.cc/B2P6-PPTC].
36. This fictional plaintiff is based on plaintiffs that were involved in real cases involving
contaminated batches of the drug Heparin. See, e.g., Estate of Johansen v. Baxter, No. 09 L
11175, 2011 WL 2976812 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 9, 2011) (awarding $625,000 to plaintiffs’ estate
after Steven Johansen died as a result of receiving contaminated Heparin from the defendant).
37. Zachary Brennan, Congressmen Slam FDA’s Handling of Investigation into Tainted
Chinese
Heparin,
REG. AFF. PROFESSIONALS SOC’Y
(Mar.
30,
2016),
https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus™/news-articles/2016/3/congressmen-slam-fda’shandling-of-investigation-into-tainted-chinese-heparin [https://perma.cc/J2K7-HNPT].
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by the transferor court. Reform might well involve fact sheets, but
submission and review ought not be encumbered by such obviously antilitigation, anticourt time limits. Nor should they be saddled with anti-ruleof-law requirements of proving a key element like causation at the outset of
a case. Such reforms, or others like them, would strive to be consistent, not
at odds, with the purposes of the MDL statute, the judicial power to manage
its cases, and the judicial role vis-à-vis rule of law. The problem with
corporate access to the legislature in procedural reform, however, is precisely
what one sees in this and other provisions of FICALA: a total (maybe even
willful) insensitivity to the judiciary’s independent power to manage its
courts and cases and to the critical role of the judiciary in preserving the rule
of law.
B. House Bill 985 Section 105(k):
Required Appeals from Nonfinal Orders
Section 105(k),38 which provides that MDL judges must permit appeals
from any order that “may materially advance the ultimate termination of one
or more civil actions in the proceedings,”39 is also anticourt and anti-rule of
law. This provision is a not so thinly veiled request by corporate entities for
Congress to lick particular litigation wounds40 with seemingly little concern
for its effect on long-standing judicial precedent, power, and discretion in the
process. While corporate defendants and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
have insisted—orally—that section 105(k) is only intended to apply to
“certain types” of orders, there is no language in the bill to that effect.41
Whatever the so-called intended scope of the language, given the current
deregulatory inclinations of Congress, corporate entities have little incentive
to narrow this provision. This provision spares these entities the difficult
practice of making their products safer,42 or of seeking substantive products38. Given the limitations of this short piece, I omit from discussion section 105(j) of
House Bill 985, though it warrants brief mention. Section 105(j) prohibits the judge to whom
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation assigns actions from “conduct[ing] a trial . . .
transferred to or directly filed in the proceedings unless all parties to that civil action consent.”
H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105(j) (2017). This provision may well not do much work in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s clear opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,
137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), but in any case, the gambit of this provision was to restrict access to
trials in what defendants view as and the American Tort Reform Association refers to as
“Judicial Hellholes.”
39. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105(i).
40. Indeed, and particularly given the statements of J&J’s attorneys that Congress wrote
the provisions of House Bill 985 “based on their experience” on the ground in MDL litigation,
this provision seems a rather direct response to J&J’s dissatisfaction with Judge Ed Kinkeade’s
denial of J&J’s motions to exclude some of plaintiffs’ experts and denial of motions for new
trial in the In re Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Pinnacle Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation,
No. 3:11-MD-2244-K, 2017 WL 4122625 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2017).
41. Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Conference Livestream, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Oct. 18,
2017),
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/blog-posts/multidistrict-litigation-mdl-conference
[https://perma.cc/H2S9-D8K4].
42. See, e.g., Charmaine Lloyd v. Johnson & Johnson (In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum
Powder Cases), No. BC628228, 2017 WL 4780572, at *1 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Oct. 20,
2017) (discussing a product known by J&J to be carcinogenic but sold anyway); Ebaugh v.
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liability legislation from Congress. Instead, it provides a quick and
nonsalient political solution: grind MDL to a halt through unlimited appeal
under a hopelessly vague standard of whether, in any given case, an order
“materially advance[s] the ultimate termination of . . . the proceedings.”43
To be clear, it is not the case that corporate entities have no avenues for
discretionary appeal in the courts. Nor is it true that those entities are failing
to avail themselves of these existing mechanisms. Instead, because district
courts are not granting requests for appeal as often as corporate entities might
like, those entities look to Congress to encroach upon that discretion.
Section 105(k) places into stark relief the power struggle between
Congress and the judiciary over procedure and case management. The
recently reiterated view of the Court—the same anti-litigation Court
referenced earlier—is that appeals from nonfinal judgments ought to be very
rare.44 It is for very good reasons that even an anti-litigation court would
resist attempts to flout the final judgment rule. Without it, cases get unduly
delayed, generate unwarranted costs, and get caught in a game of ping-pong
between the district courts and the courts of appeals.45 A legislative
encroachment upon the judiciary’s discretion over nonmandatory appeals
would pit this Congress not only against the current Court but against the
Committee on Rules on Practice and Procedure (comprised of then-Judge
Gorsuch), which rejected an almost-identical reform provision just last
year.46 This Congress would also place itself at odds with the Rules Advisory
Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2016, which rejected a
provision almost identical to section 105(k) that was proposed as an
amendment to Rule 23.47
If granted, this request would not simply have anticourt effects, but it
would also have anti-rule-of-law effects. Section 105(k) invites abuse by
both sides—it is not as if defendants would be the only parties filing motions
for appeal when dissatisfied with a ruling. The natural and normatively
undesirable effects of a provision subject to two-sided abuse are relatively
obvious: it grinds litigation to a halt, mires proceedings in endless appeals,
and potentially discourages MDLs altogether, either because litigants avoid
them or judges stop volunteering to preside over them. These effects seem
to be the strategic gambit of FICALA’s proponents.48

Ethicon, No. 130700866, 2017 WL 4181739, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 7, 2017) (discussing
a product known by J&J to cause perforation of pelvic organs but sold anyway).
43. H.R. 985 § 105 (k)(1).
44. See, e.g., Microsoft v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1707 (2017).
45. Id.
46. Letter from Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, to Judge Bob Goodlatte (Feb.
14, 2017).
47. Section 105(k) also pits this Congress against a Congress that preceded it. Because of
concerns about undue delay, unwarranted costs, and prolific satellite litigation, the 109th
Congress rejected a provision almost identical to section 105(k) when it passed the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
48. MDL judges already can certify orders for interlocutory appeals; if parties fail to
obtain such an order, that party may seek a writ of mandamus.

2018]

ENCROACHMENTS AND OPPRESSIONS

2123

C. House Bill 985 Section 105(l):
“Ensuring Proper Recovery for Plaintiffs”
On any number of fronts—including the preservation of rule of law and
access to justice—the title of this provision, “Ensuring Proper Recovery for
Plaintiffs,” portends a needed reform goal. Section 105(l) seeks to achieve
this aim by providing that plaintiffs must receive 80 percent of the proceeds
from any recovery obtained via settlement or judgment.49 That leaves 20
percent for plaintiffs’ attorneys.
How we actually achieve proper recovery for plaintiffs in mass litigation
is a complex question and the answer goes beyond the scope of this short
Article.50 However, the answer, in its simplest form, is two-fold: (1) align
attorneys’ incentives to recover with plaintiffs’ incentives and (2) align the
total amount of plaintiffs’ attorney fees with plaintiffs’ actual recovery. In
short, create a structure whereby attorneys’ zealous representation of clients’
interests also serves the attorneys’ pecuniary interests. Section 105(l) does
neither.
Instead, section 105(l) imposes a price regulation that blatantly interferes
with the free market for legal services and goes far toward ensuring that
plaintiffs will not obtain a proper recovery. This is an ironic ask by corporate
entities who have argued vociferously for the last decade that neither the
Court nor Congress should interfere with the free market for procedural
provisions in arbitration contracts. How quickly the champions of the free
market embrace “big government” paternalism when it reduces their
exposure to liability! Rather than displaying a theoretical coherence among
policy and procedural reform proposals,51 then, corporate entities seek to
obtain some of the very gains Hamilton feared: encroachment upon judicial
independence and the rule of law.
While 80 percent may sound like a good deal for plaintiffs, more is not
always more. Plaintiffs will have tremendous difficulty finding qualified
counsel to represent them under this below-market fee structure.
Diminishing the amount of potential recovery well below market value
makes taking on MDL cases much riskier for attorneys. When one subtracts
the amount a given attorney must pay to lead attorneys in an MDL in the form
of common-benefit fees,52 and the attorney’s own investment in the case
(which often includes footing the bill for expensive experts), a 20 percent cut
is often not going to be high enough to justify an attorney’s investment.
The consequences of section 105(l) for plaintiff recovery and rule-of-law
norms are not difficult to predict. First, many attorneys simply will not take
cases, no matter how meritorious. Second, even if an attorney does take on
49. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105(l)(b) (2017).
50. For a discussion regarding plaintiffs’ remedies in MDL, see generally Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2017).
51. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims, 70 VAND. L. REV.
221, 244 (2017) (demonstrating the theoretical incoherence among free-market views
regarding claim alienation within both the plaintiffs’ and defense bar).
52. See generally William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Common Benefit Fee” Is, Is Not,
and Should Be, CLASS ACTION ATT’Y FEE DIG., March 2009, at 87, 87.
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some cases, that attorney now has the following predictable but highly
undesirable incentive: package as many plaintiffs together as possible, as
quickly as possible, for a settlement that reflects litigation risk rather than
case merits. Despite this subsection’s title—which suggests that its contents
serve the interests of plaintiffs and the rule of law—it actually seems to serve
defendants’ interests in eliminating litigation or, at the very least, achieving
finality inexpensively. Yet nothing about the status quo or in the empirical
evidence53 demonstrates that this sort of price regulation is required to
recalibrate some injustice defendants are suffering.54
Moreover, like section 105(k), section 105(l) highlights the negative
effects of a procedural power struggle between the judiciary and Congress.
Judges typically exercise control over fee awards in light of the various
exigencies of the cases. Under this provision, judges are given no room to
help craft an admittedly needed solution regarding plaintiff recovery, despite
their having vastly superior expertise and discretionary ability.
Interestingly, one potential starting point for such a solution, which
expressly harnesses judicial expertise to carry out, is found in the class action
portion of FICALA. Section 103(a) provides that “any attorneys’ fee award
to class counsel that is attributed to the monetary recovery shall be limited to
a reasonable percentage of any payments directly distributed to and received
by class members.”55 This explicitly aligns attorneys’ fees with actual
plaintiff recovery, yet it leaves in place judicial discretion to award a
reasonable percentage of that recovery to the attorneys. Section 105(l) does
not attempt such a structure and instead attempts to eliminate access to justice
and hinder the preservation of rule of law altogether.
None of the foregoing is to say that MDL is perfect or that corporate
litigants and lobbyists lack legitimate complaints. Nor is it necessarily to
fault any entity, corporate or otherwise, for taking strategic advantage where
they can or to offer predictions regarding FICALA’s fate.56 This discussion
is offered, instead, both to situate FICALA within a long line of corporateled procedural-reform efforts and to illustrate the existence and consequences
of a procedural power struggle between the judiciary and Congress. This
53. See generally Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (showing empirically that defendants are not being
cheated in the mass litigation settlement process).
54. If anything, MDL is beneficial to defendants: if a defendant wins a motion to dismiss,
a large evidentiary motion, or a motion for summary judgment, the defendant wins across a
broad swath of cases—not just a single action. Further, defendants can resolve thousands of
claims in one fell swoop.
55. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 103(a) (2017). Indeed, this notion is precisely what scholars,
judges, and lawyers of all stripes agreed to in the American Law Institute’s Principles of the
Law of Aggregate Litigation section 3.13(a): “Attorneys’ fees in class actions, whether by
litigated judgment or by settlement, should be based on both the actual value of the judgment
or settlement to the class . . . .” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.13(a)
(AM. LAW INST. 2010).
56. Serious reform debates continue, whatever FICALA’s ultimate fate. See, e.g.,
Symposium, Civil Litigation Reform in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (featuring a panel on MDL reforms); Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Conference
Livestream, supra note 41 (discussing MDL problems, reform efforts, and ideas for reform).
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power struggle has led to reform efforts that tend to be rather insensitive to
encroachments upon judicial discretion, access to justice, or the preservation
of rule of law; indeed, they are often specifically aimed at achieving such
encroachments. This state of affairs has a number of implications and raises
a number of important questions about procedural theory, democratic
legitimacy, misalignment of resources in litigation, and a host of others.
Part III of this Article begins this inquiry by exploring questions involving
the scope of judicial and congressional power over procedure, with special
attention to each branch’s distinct role.
III. SEPARATION-OF-POWERS IMPLICATIONS
OF THE CORPORATIZATION OF PROCEDURE
The power struggle between the judiciary and Congress over matters of
procedure, illustrated above by FICALA, has led to the increased
politicization of procedure in both branches.57 Further, it may well explain
the judiciary’s recent tendency toward favoring corporate litigants in its
procedural decisions.58 After all, if moneyed corporate interests can obtain
congressional intervention in procedural matters in ways that are indifferent
to effects on judicial power, the judiciary has a greater incentive to hold onto
that power by preventing such matters from ever getting to Congress, perhaps
even by ceding as far as they are willing to grant corporate anti-litigation and
anti-rule-of-law requests.
Underlying this asserted connection between rule of law and procedure are
two related premises. First, as many scholars have recognized, private law
and the rule of law are inextricably interconnected; indeed, sometimes more
so than public law and rule of law, which constitute the traditional doctrinal
frame.59 Second, and less discussed in rule-of-law literature, is the integral
role of procedure—the mechanisms of private enforcement—to the
preservation of the rule of law.60 Procedure has long been the battleground
for corporate litigants and lobbyists,61 which reveals that this connection is
well understood by those who seek to limit their exposure to liability. That
57. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989).
58. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 14, at 1146 (describing the Court’s deregulatory
procedural decisions); Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11, at 1627
(analyzing the Supreme Court’s “anti-class action” jurisprudence and finding that its decisions
are more a reflection of implicit substantive choices).
59. See generally William Lucy, The Rule of Law and Private Law, in PRIVATE LAW AND
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 34, at 41; Postema, supra note 34, at 17; Henry E. Smith,
Property, Equity, and the Rule of Law, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 34,
at 224; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts and the Rule of Law, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF
LAW, supra note 34, at 139.
60. For an exploration of the connection between procedure and rule of law and related
ideas of substantive justice, see generally BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 11; SEAN
FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010); Glover, supra note 14; Lawrence B. Solum,
Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004).
61. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 2, at 1739; see also supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
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connection is readily observed in recent procedural opinions—opinions that,
beneath the surface, represent a judiciary stretching the limits of its
procedural powers to achieve more “substantive” aims under the less-salient
veil of procedure.62 These two premises, the foundations of which have been
detailed in the prior work of others and myself, reveal that the entities—be
they plaintiffs, corporations, judges, or members of Congress—that have
control over judicial procedure also have great control over the preservation,
or nonpreservation, of the rule of law.
This, however, was not always the case. Elected branches of government
have not always been as indifferent to—or in some cases, fervently devoted
to—the diminishment of judicial power or the judicial role to preserve rule
of law. Today, however, the national discourse, not to mention our Twitter
feeds, are filled with attacks on intertwined notions of rule of law and judicial
independence. These attacks, while far less eloquent than those leveled
against Hamilton’s conception of the judiciary at the time of the
Constitution’s framing, are nonetheless far more persistent, more salacious,
and—given that many of these assaults can emanate from the President of the
And these largely
United States—perhaps far more concerning.63
unprecedented64 attacks on the rule of law from the President exist alongside
a deregulatory Congress whose legislation and rhetoric has heightened what
62. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1739–40 (noting that courts risk Congress’s ire when
their procedural power is exercised in ways that attempt to conceal substantive ends). See
generally Glover, Disappearing Claims, supra note 11; Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive”
Class Action, supra note 11.
63. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians That Firing ‘Nut Job’ Comey
Eased Pressure from Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/19/us/politics/trump-russia-comey.html [https://perma.ccQHP7-BD7U]; Jeremy
Diamond, Trump ‘Disappointed’ in Sessions, Won’t Say If He Wants Him out, CNN (July 25,
2017, 5:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/25/politics/trump-press-conference/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3Y2D-QQQE] (expressing anger that Attorney General Sessions recused
himself from the Russia investigation). Some of the most publicly salient attacks on the
judiciary and the rule of law have emerged from the tweets of Donald Trump. For example,
after a federal judge struck down Trump’s immigration ban as unconstitutional, Trump
threatened the judge via tweet: “Just cannot believe a judge would put our country in such
peril. If something happens[,] blame him and court system. People pouring in. Bad!” Donald
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 3:39 PM), https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/828342202174668800 [https://perma.cc/PJG8-KEVD]. Trump also
referred to this same judge as a “so-called judge” whose decision was “ridiculous and [would]
be overturned!” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 8:12 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/827867311054974976 [https://perma.cc/3YVR2F2Z]. Trump has also questioned the impartiality of a Mexican American judge in litigation
related to Trump University, on the ground that the judge is Mexican American. Donald J.
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 30, 2016, 2:45 PM), https://twitter.com/real
DonaldTrump/status/737399475509985280 [https://perma.cc/9M4U-RDQ9] (calling Judge
Gonzalo Curiel “very unfair” and “[t]otally biased”).
64. There is at least one notable historical precedent: President Jackson refused to abide
by Justice John Marshall’s order not to displace the Cherokee Indians; Jackson sent them out
anyway and famously proclaimed, “Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.”
Jeffrey Rosen, Not Even Andrew Jackson Went as Far as Trump in Attacking the Courts,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/a-historicalprecedent-for-trumps-attack-on-judges/516144/ [https://perma.cc/AJ2Q-9ZKL]. President
Jackson’s executively ordered mass exodus is now known as the Trail of Tears and remains
one of the most shameful events in our nation’s history.
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was already a growing level of “encroachment and oppression” of the judicial
role to preserve the rule of law. Though many factors affect the judiciary’s
ability to preserve the rule of law, it seems that our current political climate
combined with our structure for procedural reform—whereby corporate
entities have multiple channels through which they can effectuate anti-ruleof-law procedural measures—ought to be more thoroughly considered and
theorized. While this Article cannot do that task justice, it can offer some
preliminary thoughts.
Keeping intact the current understanding of judicial power over
procedure—in other words, keeping constant the notion that the judiciary has
delegated supervisory power over procedure, subject to the limitations in the
Rules Enabling Act65—there nonetheless exist structural separation-ofpowers and federalism constraints that could better align procedural reform
and procedural power with the role of the judiciary to preserve the rule of
law. Both the Enabling Act, which purports to operationalize judicial power
over procedure, and the related Erie doctrine, which purports to set up
constitutional limits on federal court lawmaking power, draw separation-ofpowers lines that, if properly understood, might provide guidance as to when
and whether either the legislative or the judicial branch is most appropriately
involved with a particular procedural reform. These limitations ought to be
guided by the institutional characteristics and roles of the legislature on the
one hand and the judiciary on the other.
In diversity cases, federal courts are required by the Erie doctrine to steer
clear of interference with state substantive lawmaking prerogatives. In
federal question cases, federal courts have more breathing room vis-à-vis
interpretation of substantive law but must adhere to the separation-of-powers
limitations in the Rules Enabling Act, which precludes them from
encroaching on Congress’s lawmaking power. Moreover, as a matter of
democratic legitimacy and structural constitutionalism, major changes in
substantive law are better left to the more transparent and democratic
processes that characterize the legislative branch.66 Thus, as I have detailed
in prior work, federal courts may apply different procedural rules in different
substantive contexts only if those differences stem from the dictates of the
underlying substantive law.67 Otherwise, the judiciary would run afoul of
legislative power. I term this theory of judicial procedural power the
“principle of procedural symmetry,” and I offered it in prior work as a
challenge to the transsubstantivity principle that has long been used to
operationalize the Rules Enabling Act.68 This principle helps capture the
dual power of the judiciary and Congress over both procedure and
substantive lawmaking (at least in federal question cases) and could help
police the line between the two branches in matters of procedural reform.

65. See Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11, at 1628–29.
66. Burbank, supra note 2, at 1679.
67. See Glover, “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, supra note 11, at 1660.
68. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”).
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To illustrate the purchase these principles could have with regard to
preserving the rule of law, consider the following procedural-reform power
struggles. First, one of the more heated debates during the passage of the
PSLRA was whether Congress was intruding upon the judiciary’s power over
procedure (not to mention its expertise).69 Under both the symmetry
principle and institutional constraints on the judiciary, this debate was
misplaced. The PSLRA ultimately created a substance-specific procedural
regime for securities fraud, something arguably beyond the scope of the
judicial power over procedure under the symmetry principle, and certainly
beyond its institutional role to preserve, not recalibrate, the rule of law.
Indeed, a heightened pleading rule just for securities laws must emanate from
the substantive law of securities itself, at least absent a substantive judicial
interpretation of section 10(b)(5) of the Securities Act of 1933 that would
dictate a different application of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In short, such a proclamation of the substantive contours of
securities laws needed to emanate from Congress. The PSLRA may well
have impacted the ease with which private litigants could bring securities
claims, but the enlargement or retrenchment of substantive rights is most
properly within the ambit of the legislative branch; the judiciary can only
“preserve” the rule of law vis-à-vis the laws it is given to enforce.
In contrast, broad, transsubstantive enactments like the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) have rightly been criticized as encroachments
upon the province and expertise of the judiciary and the rulemaking
process.70 The same sorts of criticisms can be leveled against FICALA.
Here, instead of tackling the substantive issue of products-liability law,
Congress seeks to fight that war through reform to the MDL procedures as a
whole. Moreover, unlike the PSLRA, which generated robust lobbying from
both sides of the securities bar,71 broad-sweeping procedural reform like the
CJRA and the FICALA tends not to mobilize the concomitantly diffuse swath
of litigants who might one day be affected by it.72 Instead, these reforms
would truly intrude or encroach upon the supervisory power of the judiciary
to craft and enforce procedures to manage the courts and would oppress the
judiciary’s ability to fulfill its role in preserving the rule of law.73

69. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 2, at 1708–12.
70. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77
MINN. L. REV. 375, 379 (1992) (arguing that the CJRA “has effected a revolutionary
redistribution of the procedural rulemaking power from the federal judicial branch to the
legislative branch”).
71. See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 338 (1996) (noting that
the debate for reform in private securities litigation was “propelled primarily by those whose
interests [were] most directly affected, with the accounting firms and the issuer community on
one side and the plaintiffs’ bar on the other”).
72. See generally Glover, Disappearing Claims, supra note 11.
73. And just as critics of the CJRA warned, the legislative process lacks the rigorous
empirical work needed for broad-sweeping reform—a fact on blatant display in the House
report on FICALA, which does not cite a single empirical study. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-25
(2017).
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The limitation with the separation of powers on the relative powers of
Congress and the judiciary over procedure—operationalized in large part by
the procedural symmetry principle—provides guidance for the judiciary as
well. Consider the sweeping procedural reform achieved by corporate
litigants in the class-arbitration cases. While most of the arbitration cases did
not directly implicate the Rules Enabling Act or the Erie doctrine, concerns
about separation of powers were present.74 In the arbitration cases, the Court
was asked to interpret a federal procedural statute, the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), and apply it in different substantive contexts (for instance,
consumer fraud and federal antitrust law). To the extent the Court’s
interpretation of a procedural statute75 conflicted with the dictates of an
existing and duly enacted substantive statute, it is a long-standing canon of
construction that the (relatively) substantive federal statute must prevail over
the (relatively) procedural one. This canon of construction exists
harmoniously with the principle of procedural symmetry: variances in
application of procedural rules in different substantive contexts are
permissible so long as the dictates arise from substantive law; variances in
the application of substantive law across procedural contexts are not.
The Court, however, in a formalistic power grab, ignored these separationof-powers concerns altogether—a move it has made in contexts beyond
arbitration.76 Whether the currently anti-litigation Congress would have
agreed with the Court’s ultimate results in these cases is of little importance.
What matters, instead, is that in its arbitration cases, the Court recalibrated
the remedial scheme for the swath of federal substantive statutes without any
congressional input on any of those statutes, much less the particular ones at
issue in the cases the Court considered.77 Instead of staying within the
confines of preserving the rule of law, the Court recalibrated that law—a role
more appropriately undertaken by a democratically accountable legislature.
The foregoing is sufficient only to offer the following modest conclusion:
any approach to procedural reform ought to take into account the separationof-powers limitations and institutional-role differences briefly discussed
here. Instead of a dual-branch procedural reform buffet for corporate entities,
procedural reform should stem either from the dictates of substantive law or
from the relatively depoliticized Rules Advisory Committee process and
74. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s imposition of procedural bars to stating claims
betrays federal statutes like the antitrust laws).
75. Here, “procedural” is relative to other legislative enactments governing primary
conduct. See id. at 2318–19.
76. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720 (1977).
77. For instance, the Court could have reached a narrower holding in Italian Colors on
the ground that it need not reach the separation-of-powers question because Congress, in
enacting the Sherman Act, considered and rejected a class action provision. Though the issue
was briefed, see, e.g., Brief of the American Antitrust Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 17–18, Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (No. 12-133), the Court did not consider
it, instead issuing a sweeping holding that would affect all federal statutes, Italian Colors, 133
S. Ct. at 2311–12 n.4 (mentioning the Sherman Act only in a footnote in reference to Justice
Kagan’s dissenting opinion).
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appropriately constrained procedural decision-making by courts. Such a
change, though seemingly modest, could begin restoring Hamilton’s
intended role for the judiciary to preserve the rule of law and to reduce the
“encroachments and oppressions” on that role he so feared.
CONCLUSION
Much additional work is needed on this topic, as well as on various other
matters of procedural power.78 It is also true that there are many reasons
beyond mere power struggles that explain the corporatization of procedure:
the increased politicization of judicial appointments; the anti-litigation stance
of the Court filled with many of those more “politicized” appointees;79 the
long-standing perception of a litigation explosion in the United States;80 an
increasingly far-right and deregulatory Congress and executive; and a lack of
campaign-finance reform, among others. All of these considerations should
give us pause in believing that there is, in fact, a nonpoliticized branch with
which we can entrust matters of “procedure.” They further demonstrate that
there is no single solution.
That the problem of procedural regulation is complex, however, cannot
justify too much pause. The rule of law is not only caught in a procedural
power struggle that often results in its diminishment—including by the
branch entrusted with its preservation—but it is also under direct attack from
elected members of federal and state governments. As a result, separationof-powers considerations may have never mattered more. In matters of
procedure and in matters of governance, there has perhaps never been a
greater need for restraint and respect.

78. For instance, there is the lingering question of the judiciary’s “inherent” power over
procedure. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 24 (1985).
79. See, e.g., BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 11, at 244; LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA
MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE (2014).
80. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 596 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (expressing the Supreme Court’s belief that district judges were not skilled at
controlling discovery costs).

